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EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS, PERESTROIKA, AND ORTHODOXEVANGELICAL TENSIONS
By Mark Elliott
Mark R. Elliott (Christian and Missionary Alliance) has been professor of history and
director of the Institute for East-West Christian Studies, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL,
since 1986. He serves as co-editor of the East-West Church and Ministry Report. He was
previously professor of history at Asbury College, Wilmore, KY (1974-86). He holds a
B.A. from Asbury College and an M.A. and Ph.D. (1974) from the University of
Kentucky. He has written more than seventy articles and contributions to books and
encyclopedias and authored or co-edited seven books, including Ethics in the Russian
Marketplace: An Anthology (co-edited with Scott Lingenfelter) (Institute for East-West
Christian Studies, 1992), and East-West Christian Organizations Directory (Berry
Publishing, 1993).
In November, 1986, the new secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Mikhail Gorbachev, gave a typical, hard-line speech in Tashkent on the harmful influence
of religion and the need for renewed vigilance against it. However, just a year-and-a-half
later, in April, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a public meeting with Patriarch Pimen. On this
occasion, Gorbachev, an avowed atheist, extolled the patriotic and moral virtues fostered
by the Russian Orthodox Church through 1,000 years!1
This rapid reversal on religion by a communist head of state had no precedent. The Soviet
relaxation of restrictions on freedom of conscience, which this televised encounter
symbolized, proved to be but a small foretaste of wholly unanticipated, cataclysmic
developments that soon would rock the globe, namely, the collapse in 1989 of every
Soviet bloc state in Eastern Europe and, in 1991, the demise of the Soviet Communist
Party and of the Soviet Union itself.
The world of East European missions has been transformed in the wake of these
extraordinary political upheavals. Several developments deserve consideration: (1)
mission restructuring, (2) mission expansion, (3) greater and more effective mission
cooperation coexisting with a proliferation of mission mavericks and their miscues, and
(4) mission specialization.
Developments in East European Missions
1. Restructuring
In the independently minded world of evangelical missions a certain amount of flux is
always to be expected in the form of personnel and programmatic realignments, mergers,
splits, relocations, and redefinitions of goals. As the Soviet Union struggled with
perestroika (restructuring), the world of East European missions underwent major
restructuring itself. Times of great flux are hardly conducive to doing things as they
always have been done. As a consequence, many ministries caught up in the

extraordinary new opportunities experienced unexpected turbulence adjusting to the
times. Two major East European ministries, for example, suffered serious internal
schism, in part because of debates over how much of their operation, personnel, and
administration should be located in-country. Also, some portion of donors, consciously or
unconsciously, have contributed to missions focused on communist lands out of a desire
to undermine evil empires. Such support is evaporating very quickly.
2. Expansion
While recent administrative restructuring and refocus have proved difficult, particularly
for older East European ministries, the sudden removal of political barriers has
precipitated a dramatic increase in the number of missions. As a consequence of glasnost
(greater openness), East European ministries rose from approximately 150 in 1982, to
206 in 1986, to 311 in 1989, to 691 in 1993, to over 750 today.2 In addition, quite a few
ministries with worldwide programs have made substantial shifts in their allocation of
personnel and resources to former Soviet bloc countries. Since 1987 such has been the
case for the United Bible Societies, Campus Crusade, InterVarsity, Navigators, World
Vision, and Youth with a Mission, to name a few.3 Such shifts in priorities partly explain
the more prominent profile of Protestants in the East--and growing opposition to them. In
addition, the reallocation of ministry resources to former Soviet bloc states is producing
anxiety in Two-Thirds-World missions as their portion of funding declines.
The collapse of Marxist governments has prompted restructuring and expansion in
evangelical churches as well. Presumably for administrative convenience and control,
Stalin forced the merger of Protestant denominations in the U.S.S.R. and superimposed a
top-down, centralized command structure. That has now collapsed in the former Soviet
Union due to centrifugal ethnic, regional, and theological forces. In the place of one allunion Protestant denomination in 1986, twenty-nine now function in the fifteen postSoviet republics (see Appendix), and the number is likely to increase.4 One of the most
dramatic and unexpected developments among Evangelicals in the Soviet Union in the
wake of glasnost has been the explosion of independent, grassroots mission enterprises
outside existing church structures. Younger Christians, especially, took the initiative to
establish parachurch organizations focusing on a host of causes: evangelism; Christian
publishing; compassion ministries in hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and soup kitchens;
and professional associations for Christian lawyers, doctors, artists, and entrepreneurs.
Sociologist Sharon Linzey has identified 2,458 such groups in the former Soviet Union.5
Even if half this number comprise quite modest, semi-autonomous mission committees of
single churches, the other half include a striking number of quite sizeable efforts. For
example, three groups founded in 1988-89, Svet Evangeliya (Light of the Gospel) in
Rovno, the Latvian Christian Mission in Riga, and the Vozmozhnost' (Possibility)
Mission in Donetsk, alone support 540 full- and part-time workers in evangelism,
publishing, and charitable concerns.6
The outreach of these indigenous groups and of Western parachurch ministries such as
Campus Crusade, Navigators, InterVarsity, and the CoMission fosters the formation of
autonomous churches that in many cases are not joining the formerly all encompassing

Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists.7 These new church fellowships appeal to "new
converts who are put off on the one hand by Orthodox hierarchs and priests whose
democratic credentials many do not trust, and on the other hand by Baptist legalism and
lack of cultural sophistication."8
3. Greater Cooperation and More Mavericks
Observers of ministry trends in former Soviet bloc countries have had to deal with the
paradox of a growing number of unusually productive mission partnerships coexisting
with a host of poorly prepared mission mavericks making disturbing miscues at nearly
every turn. With regard to cooperation, the world of Protestant East European missions,
notorious for lone rangers and secretiveness, managed to take glasnost to heart quickly.
For example, in 1987-89 alone, various cooperative agreements to expedite Bible
deliveries involved at least twenty-eight separate denominations, missions, and Bible
societies. Public East European ministry meetings to facilitate networking, informationsharing, and cooperation numbered at least sixteen in 1990-91.9 More recent
collaborative efforts include the formation of seven new national evangelical alliances
and eleven new Bible societies in former East bloc states, the CoMission involving
eighty-five agencies in a program of Christian ethics and outreach in post-Soviet public
schools, the Alliance for Saturation Church Planting (AD 2000, World Team, Slavic
Gospel Association, DAWN, and United World Mission), the Albanian Encouragement
Project involving sixty-five groups, Russian Ministries' multi-mission Project 250 to train
indigenous evangelists (RM, TEAM, CB International, World Team), and a cooperative
Russian theological textbook project for the benefit of over 100 new Protestant
seminaries and Bible institutes (RM, Overseas Council for Theological Education and
Missions, the Maclellan Foundation, and the Institute for East-West Christian Studies).10
Unfortunately, the simultaneous entrance of literally hundreds of new missions into
former Soviet bloc countries has confounded the prospects for meaningful cooperation.
The more independently minded new players tend to advance prepackaged programs that
take little account of the cultural context. Too often a wild West, free-spirit, lone-ranger
approach to preaching ends in what might be called hit-and-run evangelism, with its
neglect of discipling for new believers and its inattention to genuine partnerships with
existing churches.11
Gross cultural insensitivity on the part of too many Western and Korean ministries stems
in no small measure from inadequate or nonexistent country-specific orientation: little or
no study of the region's history, literature, and language. Ministry orientation frequently
focuses on what might be called generic preparation, that is, the cultivation of skills and
outlooks applicable to any cross-cultural experience from Papua New Guinea to Poland,
to the neglect of an adequate entre to the specific country of destination. Many Russians
as a consequence take deep offense at Western witnesses who all too often display a
profound ignorance of the Orthodox Church, of literary giants such as Dostoevski and
Tolstoy, and of landmarks of Russian history as fundamental as the conversion of Rus,
the emancipation of the serfs, or the Revolutions of 1917. They also observe Western
missionaries who champion in one and the same breath Christ crucified, market
economics, and Western democracy. Such missionary miscues, which result at least in

part from inadequate preparation, not only undermine Christian witness but also fuel the
growing red-brown (communist-nationalist) antagonism toward any Western influence in
Russia.
4. Specialization
Recognizing postcommunist missions miscues, and recalling the region's longstanding
tradition of state churches identified with particular nationalities, one can more readily
explain the genesis of various legislative measures to curb Western missionary activity.
However, ill-advised and ill-informed Christian witness is only part of the explanation for
reaction. Communists, nationalists, and the hierarchs of former state churches also
oppose evangelical missionaries because they just as often are warm, winsome, and
loving as they are brash, brazen, and culturally clueless. Opposition, then, is as much a
function of what Evangelicals are doing right as it is of what they are doing wrong. It
may be argued that so many ministries are having such a beneficial effect, in so many
places, in so many ways, that detractors of Evangelicals cannot tolerate it. As a result
they seek to restrict freedom of conscience by erecting political barriers to
"nontraditional" faiths.
In the meantime, large numbers of Western ministries are making an impact for the good
in former Soviet bloc countries through all manner of specialized assistance: a)
facilitating in-country radio broadcasting, publishing, and film and video production; b)
partnering with nationals to provide Sunday-School to seminary-level training; c) sharing
expertise in marriage, family, youth, prison, alcohol, and drug counseling; and d)
introducing sports, camping, and drama ministries, to name just a sampling of the
burgeoning kaleidoscope of Western evangelical endeavors.12
Orthodox-Evangelical Relations
That many Orthodox see such efforts as pernicious rather than praiseworthy necessitates
a deeper look at Orthodox-Evangelical interaction. "When we say `the Church' we always
mean the Orthodox Church and no other," reported one respondent in a mid-1980's poll
conducted in the Soviet Union by Russian emigre Eugene Grosman. "It has been
established by Christ, and has had no deviations, neither left nor right. All the rest are
false churches or sects that went astray." In the same survey Russian Evangelicals
typically voiced opinions just as intolerant, dismissing Orthodoxy as "a dead Church"
with "drunkards" for priests. "They know how to cross themselves, and nothing else. . . .
Worshipping those icons, lighting the candles, praying for the dead, it's all idolatry."13 In
the Russian Empire and in the Soviet era, most grassroots Protestants and Orthodox
rarely moved beyond such negative stereotypical images of each other. It is no different
today--arguably worse--as more and more Western ministries work in East Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union. These days, the mutual tolerance and respect among
Western Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox, built up painfully over centuries,
frequently evaporates in a flash in the cauldron of ethnic and confessional strife now
raging from the Balkans to the Baltics to Siberia.

Most Western Protestants give little if any thought to Orthodoxy, not out of hostility but
out of ignorance. In the United States, approximately 3,000,000 Orthodox numerically
equal better-known Mormons but have a marginal impact upon American society. Some
U.S. Orthodox fear that nominal involvement by members in church activities may
explain much of their invisibility.14 Also, Northern urban industrial cultural ghettos hide
many Orthodox from view.
Evangelicals' unfamiliarity with Orthodoxy also stems in part from a lack of appropriate
literature. In contrast to an abundance of contemporary Orthodox writing in the West
concerning Protestantism, a scarcity exists of contemporary evangelical perspectives on
Orthodoxy. Perhaps the fact that Orthodoxy in the West has had to contend with a far
larger Protestant presence explains its attention to what sets it apart from Reformation
churches.15
In contrast, Protestants have focused attention on Orthodoxy only sporadically:
--In the sixteenth century, Anglicans saw Orthodox as natural allies against papal claims
to church leadership.16
--Calvinists and Anglicans profoundly influenced Patriarch Cyril Lukaris (1572-1638),
although his Protestant leanings scandalized the Orthodox world and led to his
condemnation as a heretic.17
--John Wesley had a deep and abiding appreciation for Eastern church fathers.18
--Various mainline Protestant denominations conduct ongoing bilateral theological
dialogues with Orthodox.19
--Individual Protestant scholars such as Jaroslav Pelikan and James Stamoolis have
written their share of perceptive academic studies of Orthodox history and theology.20
Nevertheless, the vast majority of Protestants, from the sixteenth century on, have had
little contact with, or understanding of, Eastern Orthodoxy. Underscoring the point, a
1991 handbook on U.S. higher education reproduced outlines of sixteen courses treating
Christian-Marxist relations, seventeen on liberation theology, but less than a half dozen
with a major focus on Orthodoxy.21
In the post-World War II period the most significant exception to the rule of minimal
Protestant-Orthodox interaction has been their encounter in the ecumenical movement.
There Orthodox have been steadfast and often lonely champions of what Evangelicals
would consider basic Christian beliefs. Interestingly, unlike Protestantism and
Catholicism, Orthodoxy has never produced any sizeable movement within its ranks that
takes a skeptical view of the reliability of scripture or that questions the divinity,
miracles, or resurrection of Jesus Christ or that challenges historic Christian social
teachings, such as the sinfulness of sexual relations outside heterosexual marriage.22 If
the Achilles heel of Orthodoxy, historically, has been its tendency to align itself with, or

capitulate to, secular power, its strength has been its tenacious preservation of the faith
once received.23 For that reason it would appear that evangelical Christians have more in
common theologically with Orthodox believers than with mainline Protestants.
However, this common ground counts for very little as Evangelicals make their way into
territory that Orthodox consider to be their exclusive domain. Here the key question is:
East of the old Iron Curtain, are Evangelicals interlopers? Many Orthodox Christians, for
example, believe that Protestants have no place in Russia. In particular, they see recent
evangelical activity from abroad as an unwelcome and offensive intrusion into a spiritual
landscape nourished by a millennium of Byzantine Christianity. Western missionaries
working in countries with long-standing Orthodox traditions definitely need to apply
themselves to a study of history and culture in order to understand this heritage.
However, even as Evangelicals come to appreciate Orthodoxy, the exceptional
achievements of Russian culture, and the remarkable perseverance of a long-suffering
people, they should not feel that they need to apologize for sharing the Good News in a
Russia minus Marx. One major reason is demographic: Evangelicals are motivated by
Russia's huge nonbelieving population. Recent survey data suggest that as many as sixtynine percent of Russian men and forty-six percent of Russian women do not identify
themselves as religious believers. Thus, Evangelicals have ample room to minister to
millions of Russians who are spiritually adrift, without ever engaging in proselytizing,
that is, specifically targeting adherents of one church in an attempt to lure them into
another.24
Western Evangelicals naturally want to support a movement of some 3,000,000
indigenous Protestants whose origins in the Russian Empire now date back well over a
century.25 What the Russian Orthodox must decide is whether or not they prefer a
democratic to an authoritarian government, keeping in mind that true democracies by
definition include tolerance for minorities and minority opinions. It has been said that
how a majority treats its most despised minority is the best test of its commitment to
democracy and human rights. Vaclav Havel has said this about Czech treatment--or
mistreatment--of Gypsies. Today the question must be posed: Does the majority faith in
Russia, Orthodoxy, have sufficient confidence in itself to tolerate religious dissent, or
must it repeat history and retreat to dependence upon the state to provide it with a
legislative advantage, if not a monopoly? Based on Europe's sad experience with state
churches, it would appear that nothing could be more deadening to Orthodox spiritual
vitality than artificial, secular supports propping up a privileged church.
When survey researchers asked Russians, "Do you or do you not agree with the opinion
that members of the Orthodox Church should have advantages compared to atheists and
people of other religious beliefs?" sixty-six percent of respondents favored equal legal
status for all faiths.26 In fact, Russians, whom scholars often have characterized as
historically conditioned conformists, now favor far more diversity than do some Western
champions of Russian culture. Ironically, Western criticism of evangelical outreach in
Russia often comes from quarters that advocate cultural and religious pluralism for the
West--but apparently not for the East.27

For 2,000 years Christians of all confessions have struggled with the tension between
respecting other cultures and sharing the gospel across cultures. As early as the firstcentury church (Acts 15) Christ's disciples debated whether or not to require circumcision
of gentile Christians. In the nineteenth century, closer to the present, and closer to the
issue at hand, Prof. Nicholas Il'minskii (1822-91) of the Kazan Theological Academy
labored quite effectively to foster Orthodox missions that treated non-Slavic peoples with
respect. His advocacy for the Divine Liturgy and Orthodox popular schooling in the
languages of the Volga Tatars and the peoples of Siberia and Central Asia had
considerable success and had a major impact on tsarist policy in the late nineteenth
century.28
As this issue of appropriate witness relates to current Orthodox-Evangelical tensions,
defenders of the Eastern Church deplore evangelical activity in Russia today, seeing it as
a spiritual affront. However, are Orthodox justified in their desire to exclude Western
evangelical ministries from the former Soviet Union on territorial grounds? Before
conceding that Russia should be spared non-Orthodox influences, imagine how
comfortable Orthodox themselves would be if the argument were taken to its logical
conclusion. For instance, if a faith's legitimacy were to depend upon its being
longstanding or first in a particular location, then what justification did Prince Vladimir
have in suppressing an ancient pagan pantheon in favor of Orthodox Christianity? What
justification did Orthodox missionaries in Siberia have in competing with native
shamans, thereby interfering with the region's traditional religion?
Many Christians historically have argued that the proclamation of the gospel among
nonbelievers is legitimate, even if in the process it alters a native culture. But, what
should we make of the argument that one Christian confession's witness in a territory that
is already the home of another Christian confession is illegitimate? If one were to accept
that a majority Christian confession by rights should have territorial prerogatives, then,
for example, Sts. Cyril and Methodius should not have begun their work in Moravia,
where missionaries from Rome were already in evidence; Orthodox conversions among
Estonian and Latvian Lutherans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should not
have occurred; and Orthodox, who were second to Protestants or Catholics in every U.S.
state except Alaska, should not be mailing unsolicited packets of information on
Orthodoxy to Episcopal priests across the U.S.
Opponents of Western Protestant outreach in Russia sometimes argue as follows:
Protestants should either help Orthodoxy recoup and recover or stand aside and allow it
time to regain its strength, rather than take spiritual advantage of its present weakened
condition. Consequently, we are told, Orthodox should have either first or exclusive
access to the Russian people. Evangelicals, however, see a state church status for
Orthodoxy as a tsarist throwback that a clear majority of Russians have said they do not
want. One wonders in all sadness how realistic the current prospects are for an Orthodox
institutional and spiritual rejuvenation, given the fact that the present leadership, in place
thanks to the Soviet Council of Religious Affairs and the KGB, has yet to undergo
anything approaching perestroika.29

Despite Soviet domination of the church in the twentieth century, Orthodoxy is, and
probably will remain, the preeminent cultural and religious reality in Russia. Still,
Protestantism can render Orthodoxy a service in the same way that the Reformation
stimulated reform within Roman Catholicism. In tsarist Russia Protestant growth in a
given region often helped reenergize Orthodoxy out of a complacency born of being a
state church.
Conclusion
The cultural faux pas in evangelical missions to former Soviet bloc countries bring to
mind the grievous errors committed in Protestant missions to China prior to 1949. Yet,
Arthur Glasser's thought-provoking summary of China missions lessons highlights the
promise as well as the peril in a way that also fits former East bloc missions:
It is amazing what Western missionaries were able to accomplish in China. And this in
spite of themselves. . . . They made every conceivable mistake in methodology. And yet,
due to their diligence, their capacity for sacrifice and the grace of God, they planted the
church in all the provinces of China.30
Similarly, in Europe minus Marx, many evangelical missionaries are having a powerful
impact for good and for the gospel, despite frequently inadequate preparation, harmful
cultural baggage, and faulty notions of how best to proceed. One particular ministry to
the former Soviet Union has blustered in with a) unrealistic, stratospheric statistical
predictions of what its impact will be; b) a missionary force embarrassingly ignorant of
Russia Orthodoxy, Russian culture, and the Russian language; and c) top-heavy
administrative costs that ought to cause careful Christian stewards to blush. Nevertheless,
the self-denial, the sincerity, and the genuine love this ministry's ill-prepared but caring
missionary servants bring to their work with ordinary Russians is having an extraordinary
impact in terms of spiritually transformed lives. Whatever the missionary miscues, in
many Russian minds they count for less than their own yearning for truth, for spiritual
assurance, and for godly solace in a world now best characterized as unpredictable,
avaricious, impoverished, and despairing.
Certainly no Christian outreach should be satisfied with any effort that is less than
excellent, completely forthright, and transparent, as befits servants of the Christ. Yet, the
scriptures, missions history, and current experience all suggest that God manages to use
even weak and flawed vessels for divine purposes.
APPENDIX: PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION
I. Churches Present since 1917 (regardless of official status)
Evangelical Christian-Baptist
Lutheran

Mennonite
Pentecostal
Seventh-day Adventist
II. Churches in Lands Annexed in World War II
Hungarian Reformed (Transcarpathia)
Methodist (now active outside Estonia)
III. Reemerging Churches
Armenian Evangelical and Baptist
Brethren
Church of Christ
Evangelical Christian
Molokane
The Salvation Army
United Pentecostal
IV. New Churches
Christian and Missionary Alliance
Christian Life Centers
Christian Reformed
Church of God, Anderson
Church of the Nazarene
Estonian Christian Church
Evangelical Covenant
Evangelical Free

Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
Nazarene
New Apostolic
Pentecostal Holiness
Presbyterian
Wesleyan
Word of Life
V. Unaffiliated Churches (founded by Western and indigenous parachurch missions)
For example: Moscow Bible Church and St. George's Church, Moscow
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